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"Sartor Resartus"t
(The Tailor Retailored)
BY GRAHAM SUSMAN*
Otis Williams, a storekeeper in Granite Falls, North Carolina, a
middle-aged father of four, fell in love with plump Lillie Hendrix, wife
of the store's handyman. With romance in their hearts they drove west
to Las Vegas, Nevada, where they found the housing problem to be as
acute as elsewhere in the country. They settled down to a six-week vacation in a transient auto court, obtained Nevada divorces, immediately
remarried in Nevada, and returned home in anticipation of a happy
future. Little did they realize as they chugged their way across the continent that they were setting the wheels in motion in a legal proceeding
which would twice bring their case to the North Carolina Supreme Court
and twice to the United States Supreme Court. Nor did they realize that
the result of their action would seriously affect the lives and the future of
countless thousands who had obtained non-contested decrees-regardless
of where they had been entered.
Upon their return to North Carolina, they were arrested for bigamous cohabitation, 1 and the jury found them guilty, refusing to give
recognition to the Nevada decrees and their subsequent remarriage. The
case was appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court, where it was
affirmed. 2 An appeal was then taken to the United States Supreme
Court, which reversed the state court in Williams I.3 It must be noted,
however, that in this decision the question of residence and domicile was
not raised on appeal, but was predicated upon the theory that one state
was not bound to recognize a foreign divorce decree, based upon substituted service where the defendant made no appearance. Such had been
the rule for many years on the authority of the Haddock case, 4 which
was thereupon expressly overruled. The court held that each state must
give full faith and credit to the judicial acts, records, and decrees of every
tA sequel to "So You Want a Nevada Divorce," 21 DICTA 6, June, 1944.
*Of the Denver bar.
1
Sec. 14-183 Gen. Stat. of N. C. (1943).
2
State vs. Williams, 220 N. C. 445, 17 S. E. (2d) 769 (1941).
'Williams vs. No. Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 87 L. Ed. 279, 63 S. Ct. 207, 143
A. L. R. 1273 (1943).
'Haddock vs. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867 (1906).
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other state, and that North Carolina must give effect to the Nevada
decrees.
In its decision, however, the Supreme Court was careful to point
out that no attack had been made by the State of North Carolina on the
question of the bona fides of the defendants' residence in Nevada, and
that "it must treat the present case * * * precisely the same as if petitioners had resided in Nevada for a term of years and had long ago
acquired a permanent abode there." Under such circumstances, the court
gave effect to the full faith and credit clause and held the Nevada decree
to be good. It added, however, a qualifying statement, which left open
the issue as to whether one state could questian the bona fides of the
domicile acquired in another. The court said:
"Nor do we reach the question as to the power of North Carolina to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce decrees because, contrary to findings of the Nevada Court, North Carolina
finds that no bona fide domicile was acquired in Nevada."
Newspapers and lawyers throughout the country pointed to this
decision as proof that Nevada divorce decrees had reached a point of
legal respectability and Nevada divorce business continued to grow. In
fact, the publicity was so widespread that one court 5 took judicial notice
thereof and said:
"Were it not for the misleading press notices and the generally confused discussion of the Williams case * * * it would
scarcely be necessary to point out the limited effect of this decision."
But the dignity of the State of North Carolina had not yet been
vindicated, and the storekeeper and his newly acquired wife were again
promptly arrested, tried, and again found guilty. On appeal to the North
Carolina Supreme Couit, the conviction was affirmed, 6 and again it was
brought to the United States Supreme Court7 on the precise question that
the court had failed to answer in Williams I.
In a six to three decision, Justice Frankfurter writing the opinion
for the three justices whose views were expressed in "The opinion of
the court," the court held that North Carolina could determine for itself
whether the parties were so domiciled in Nevada as to confer jurisdiction
there. The court pointed out that after a contest upon jurisdictional
questions, these cannot be re-litigated as between the parties,8 but those
not parties, snould not be so foreclosed, especially a state which is
concerned with the vindication of its own policy, and has no other means
to protect that interest against the selfish action of those outside its
3

Commonwealth vs. Esenwein, 153 Pa. Supr. 69, 33 Ati. (2d) 675 (1943).
'State vs. Williams, 224 N. C. 183, 29 S. E. (2d) 744 (1944).
'Williams vs. No. Carolina, 65 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1123 (1945).
'But see contra Solotoff vs. Solotoff, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 510 (1945).
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borders. If such findings were conclusive, the policy of each state in
matters of most intimate concern could be subverted by the policy of
every other state.
The court added that a divorce decree must be respected by all the
states, provided "the conditions for the exercise of power by the divorcedecreeing court are validly established whenever that judgment is elsewhere called into question. In short, the decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudication of everything except the jurisdictional fact upon which
it is founded, and domicile is a jurisdictional fact. To permit the necessary finding of domicile by one state to foreclose other states in the protection of their social institutions would be intolerable."
Justice Rutledge, in a strong and vigorous dissent, pointed out that
the decree is valid in Nevada-based upon evidence presented to that
court-and the subsequent marriage of the parties in Nevada is also
valid. If it is concededly valid, then neither North Carolina nor anyone
else can qualify it by saying it shall not be effective in North Carolina,
while it is effective in Nevada, and stands without impeachment.
Justice Black discussed the uncertainty caused by the decision, and
stated that the court's opinion "will cast a cloud over the lives of countless numbers of the multitude of divorced persons in the United States
* * * it undermines and makes uncertain the validity of every uncontested divorce decree. It wipes out every semblance of their finality and
decisiveness * * * the result is to classify divorced persons in a distinctive and invidious category."
Justice Murphy in a separate concurring opinion takes issue with
Justice Black, and states that "there are no startling or dangerous implications in the judgment * * * all of the uncontested divorces that
have ever been granted in the forty-eight states are as secure today as
they were yesterday, or as they were before our previous decision in this
case. Those based upon fraudulent domiciles are now and always have
been subject to later re-examination with possible serious consequences."
It is apparent that this decision not only affects the finality of Nevada decrees, but opens up the right of any state to question the validity
of a non-contested decree obtained in another. It weighs one state public
policy against that of another. No final determination of its own jurisdiction can therefore be made by a state court in a non-contested case.
9
And since domicile involves a mixed question of law and fact, it is possible for a jury in one state to uphold the decree while a jury in another
will reach an opposite conclusion, based upon the same identical evidence.
Who can know, therefore, or guess what rights he may exercise upon a
divorce decree obtained in another state? How far can he rely thereon?
'19 Corpus Juris 441.
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It is true that many of the states have followed the right to question such foreign decrees even prior to Williams II. In Colorado our
Supreme Court has recently held to the same effect in denying validity
to a Nevada decree. 10
This case was decided after the decision in Williams I, but before
Williams II. The husband, who had been a resident of Colorado, went
to Nevada, stayed the required time, and obtained a decree of divorce in
his favor. The wife was personally served with summons in Colorado,
but did not appear in the suit either personally or by attorney. After he
obtained the decree, the husband returned to Colorado, where he resumed
his residence. The lower court found that the husband had gone to
Nevada solely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, but held with
expressed reluctance that Williams I precluded any inquiry by a Colorado court into the fact findings of the Nevada court on jurisdictional
matters, and compelled recognition under the full faith and credit
clause. The Supreme Court ruled that it was not so precluded, and
that a foreign divorce decree entered upon such service is invalid if obtained by one not bona fide domiciled within the jurisdiction of the
court granting the divorce. The court held that the Williams decision
"did not disturb the pre-existing rule that a court of a state within whose
jurisdiction neither one of the parties to a divorce suit is a bona fide domicile has no jurisdiction to render a divorce decree which would be binding in other states under the full faith and credit clause."
If the State of Colorado may question the jurisdiction of the Nevada court or the domicile of a successful party in that court, then the
Nevada court may likewise question a decree obtained in Colorado. And
while the Colorado court or jury may be satisfied that it had jurisdiction
to enter a decree, a Nevada court or jury may decide otherwise on the
same evidence. Consider the status of a woman who marries a man who
has just obtained a divorce decree and marries in reliance upon its validity. Must she be compelled to retain counsel to ascertain whether her
new husband had sufficiently established his domicile in the state decreeing the divorce? And since the matter of domicile is one upon which
men may reasonably differ, how certain can she be after the ascertainment
of such fact? Perhaps a jury in another state may think otherwise.
The public is entitled to know once and for all whether a Nevada
divorce is good or no good-without equivocation; whether a man's second marriage is valid -or whether he is just living with a mistress;
whether his children begotten by his second marriage are legitimate or
not; whether his first wife is married to someone else, or whether her
marriage is also void; whether her children are legitimate or not; whether
'0 Koscove vs. Koscove.
1945.)

113 Colo. -,

156 P. (2d)

696.

(Decided Feb. 26
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his first or second wife is entitled to his estate upon his death, et cetera
and ad infinitum.
It is not enough to say that it all depends on whether he intended
to make his home in Nevada at the time the decree was entered, regardless of what the Nevada court found on this subject; that it depends
further on what some jury in another state, even years afterwards, may
determine what was in his mind when in Nevada; or what he did after
he obtained his decree; that his status and that of his former spouse and
even of his freedom shall depend upon the finding of a jury upon the
debatable question of domicile-and which question could be raised in
any and every state he might enter.
Consider the poor traveling salesman who had obtained a Nevada
decree, married, and is traveling across the country with his new wife. It
would be incumbent upon him to ascertain in every state he entered
whether he was lawfully married therein, or whether he was a bigamist.
And even if his lawyer traveled with him, he could be of little help, as
the determination of that question could only be made by a local jury
in every state.
The United States Supreme Court has heretofore held 1 that when
the defendant enters a special appearance in a case prosecuted in a state
other than that of his residence, for the sole purpose of raising a question
of jurisdiction, and the decision is adverse to such contention, the question of jurisdiction becomes res adjudicata and cannot again be litigated.
In fact, this is mentioned in Williams II when the court, speaking of
jurisdictional questions, stated: "After a contest, these cannot be re-litigated as between the parties."
The theory thereunder is to give the opposite party an opportunity
to present his contentions, and a recital of the jurisdiction in such a
divorce decree is not subject to attack anywhere.l Why could not this
theory, or principle, be extended to default cases where the defendant
has.been properly served with process, and is given an opportunity to
present his evidence, but chooses not to do so? Must the validity of a
jurisdictional recital in a decree be based upon whether or not there had
been a contest? This is not the test used in other types of civil proceedings.
The right of a state to collaterally attack decrees entered in another,
casts doubt upon the validity of all divorces which have been obtained
by resort to the courts of another state. Lawyers and judges have been
seeking a way out of the confusion. In Colorado two bills were passed
by the 1945 Legislature on the subject. Senate Bill 57 provided in effect
that no decree of divorce entered-by a court of this state, or another state,
'Davis vs. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 83 L. Ed. 26, 59 Sup. Ct. 3.

"See Note 8.
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shall indefinitely remain subject to impeachment here, provided it appears that (1) the court which entered the decree was vested with jkirisdiction to grant divorce decrees and (2) that such court determined that
it had jurisdiction to grant said decree. It provided further for a one year
limitation on impeachment if the defendant was personally served with
process, or accepted, or waived service, or otherwise entered his appearance, and a two year limitation on impeachment in all other cases. Section 3 of the bill outlines its purpose in the-following language:
"In order to foster and preserve the integrity of conjugal relations, and the stability of family ties, and to protect children born
to parents one or both of whom may previously have been married
and divorced, and other innocent persons affected thereby, from the
turmoil, indignity, and notoriety attendant upon proceedings, the
purpose of which is to inquire into the regularity of divorce proceedings to ifivalidate the same, and in order to render definite and
certain the status of divorced persons, the General Assembly hereby
finds, determines, and declares the public policy of this state to be
that decrees of divorce, regular on their face, whether entered by the
courts of this state, or of any other state, territory, or commonwealth within the United States, should not be questioned for any
cause whatsoever after the lapse of a reasonable time as in this Act
is provided: and to effectuate this policy, this Act shall be liberally
construed."
Senate Bill 58 provided, inter alia, that when a final decree of divorce of this state, or any other state, is attacked, a certified copy of such
decree shall be admitted in evidence without further proof of its genuineness, and when so admitted, shall be prima facie proof (1) that said
decree of divorce was duly made and entered, (2) that the court, if it be
a foreign court, was vested with jurisdiction to grant decrees of divorce
by the laws of the state wherein it was entered, and (3) that the cQurt
which entered the decree determined that it had jurisdiction to grant the
decree, and that it had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter
of the cause.
The two bills were vetoed on March 1, .1945, by Governor Vivian,
who doubted their constitutionality and who asserted that the bills
would "certainly furnish ample opportunity of committing fraud in
divorce actions."
The State of Delaware recently passed a bill allowing recognition
-by Delaware courts to divorces or annulments granted in other states
and foreign countries. Bills to broaden the grounds for divorces have
been introduced in various states by proponents who contend that out-
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of-state divorces of questionable validity should be averted by relaxing
and unifying the divorce laws of all states.'"
Justice Rutledge believes that the courts should avoid the tremendous confusion resulting from its decision by definitely adopting one of
two policies: first, by ruling that transient divorces, founded on fly-bynight residence, are invalid where rendered, as well as elsewhere, and
second, an opposite policy frankly conceding state power to grant transient or short term divorces, provided due process requirements for giving
notice to the other spouse were complied with. In his view, the opinion
in*Williams II gives effect to neither one of these theories. It is a compromise which vitiates both "and does so in a manner wholly capricious
alike for the institutional and the individual aspects of the problem."'
There is considerable merit to both of these suggestions. By the
adoptiQn of either of them, objective standards of proof would apply
instead of the highly variable common law conception of domicile. The
trouble with domicile; says Justice Rutledge, is its dependence upon a
state of mind. "It can be changed in a twinkling of an eye-the time it
takes a man to make up his mind to remain where he is when he is away
from home. He need do no more than decide, by a flash of thought, to
stay either permanently, or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time.
No legal conception, save possibly 'jurisdiction' * * * affords such
possibilities for uncertain application."
While the difficulty of working out any system is apparent-so
long as each of the forty-eight states can now determine their own policies and laws, still some solution to the problem must be found. The
importance of the question should stimulate profound thought and study
by serious-minded judges, lawyers and legislators,, who appreciate that
in our social structure certainty must be substituted for doubt in the
matter of marriage, divorce and legitimacy of children.
And what about Otis Williams and Lillie Hendrix, who still languish in jail, despite the fact that Williams' first wife has since died and
Lillie's former husband has since remarried?

Colorado Bar Association ANNUAL MEETING
It has just been definitely decided-that the annual meeting will be
held October 18, 19 and 20 at the Broadmoor Hotel. It is suggested
that you write immediately for reservations, which will be limited to
150 in the hotel. Further announcement of the program will be made
through the Public Ledger or the next issue of DICTA.
"Legislation which would have required Florida to recognize divorces obtained
"inother jurisdictions" was vetoed by Governor Caldwell on the grounds that it was
too broad and might result in validating decrees outside the United States.
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Upon Information and Belief
Keeping Up with Change
Lawyers have, from early times, been the leaders of community
thought and action. Lawyers played a great part in the development of
the great English charters, the writing of the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution of the United States. Lawyers have been
more than well recognized by representation in Congress and in the state
legislatures, and in the executive offices. Lawyers have almost exclusively occupied the benches. In these positions of prominence, and as
public speakers and debaters, and the motivating force of many civic
organizations, the lawyers have molded public thought and opinion.
It is, therefore, distressing to note the lack of attention which some
lawyers give to changes in the law. If lawyers are going to mold public
opinion, they must take cognizance of changes. If the public discovers
that there are lawyers still operating under repealed laws, the shaking of
public confidence in the bar, which is already noticeable, will probably
reach earthquake proportions.
. A rather cursory survey of published legal notices indicates that
there is a great disregard of legislation passed by the state legislature in
1945. One act which has been disregarded has been referred to in three
separate issues of DICTA, and in the loose-leaf supplement accompanying
DICTA containing a digest of all the laws passed in 1945.
We ,know of no better way to bring the changes in the law to the
attention of the lawyers than through the pages of DICTA. If we did
know of a better way, we would use it.
Of course, those lawyers who have not kept abreast with the
changes in the law, will not read this. But if any of our readers do have
ideas as to how the lawyers can be made more responsive to the changes
in the law, we would like to have those suggestions.
Integration of the Bar
The other day I was in another state, and in discussing with some
of the leaders of the bar other matters, the question of integration of the
bar was brought up. This state has one of the oldest integrated bars.
Two different members of the bar said that they would never go back
to the voluntary bar, after havinj lived under an integrated bar. I asked
why this was so, and will try to record accurately their answers.
Under an integrated bar, all practicing attorneys must belong to
the state bar and pay the annual fee. It is very easy to distinguish the
active, practicing attorneys from those who were admitted to practice
but are not actively practicing. Practicing attorneys are readily identified
in a county where they might not be well known, or in another state, by
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the exhibition of their cards showing payment of current year's dues.
The right to practice may be easily proven by this method.
All members of the state bar participate in the election of the state
bar commissioners, and in the participation in this election all members
know that the state bar commission truly represents the bar of the state,
and all members of it.
The state bar may speak on matters of interest to the bar and everyone knows that it speaks as the voice of all lawyers.
Lawyers who have not taken an interest in the voluntary bar and
its affairs now find themselves as members of the state bar, and being so
do take an interest. There follows an enlargement of the state bar and
active participation in its programs, particularly those of public enlightenment.
The ethical standards of the members are more readily controlled.
The state bar does not bring a great number of disciplinary actions and
very seldom is a lawyer suspended or disbarred. The state bar does adopt
ethical standards and the lawyer, knowing that disciplinary action can
be take.n effectively, is more anxious to comply with the ethical standards. The state bar does not go out and investigate all lawyers tosee if
they are complying with the ethical standards; it initiates an investigation only where a complaint is filed with it; in other words, there is not
a great deal more disciplinary action taken under a state bar than voluntary bar, but the set-up of the state bar, and the possibility of effective
action, encourages the lawyers to adhere more closely to the ethical
standards.

Admitted to a Higher Court
Alexander Lee Doud, Dean of the Denver Bar, died July 24th,
after two weeks in the hospital, at the age of ninety-four. In 1936 he
was given a life membership in the Denver Bar Association, at an annual
banquet of the association. He came to Denver sixty-one years ago from
Illinois, where he had been ill, and upon engaging in practice in Denver
his health steadily improved, so that he was able to achieve the remarkable feat of carrying on an active law practice at the age of ninety-four.
He was active in obtaining a charter for the Denver University and in
recognition of his services was elected to the Board of Trustees. He
observed his fiftieth anniversary on the board last January. He was for
many years President of the Board of Trustees of Trinity Methodist
Church. He was chosen to deliver the dedicatory address upon the dedication of the City and County Building. He was a Mason for sixtyeight years, and was at one time President of the Crown Hill Cemetery
Association. He was an enthusiastic golfer, and enjoyed a good game of
golf, even during his later years. He contributed a loving cup for older
golfers tournament held annually at City Park.
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Boulder County Bar Association
Program for 1945-1946
OFFICERS
President ----------------------------------------------Vice-President ------------------------------

W illiam E. Buck
-John R. Wolff

Secretary
Treasurer

Rudolph Johnson
Lyman P. Weld

--------------------------

Meetings to be held at 6 :30 p. m. on the third Monday of
each month, September, 1945, through May, 1946
August 22
Longmont, Five Acres
Special meeting in honor of Associate Justice Wiley B. Rutledge of the
U. S. Supreme Court.
September 17
Boulder
Topic, Real Estate Title Standards; joint meeting with realtors of the
county; speaker, Edwin J. Wittelshofer.
October 15
Longmont
Topic, Federal and State Death and Inheritance Taxes; speaker, Albert
J. Gould.
November 19

Boulder

Topic, Testamentary Trusts; joint meeting with bankers of the county:
speaker Stanley H. Johnson.
December 17
Boulder
The Transmountain Diversion of Water for Power and Irrigation Purposes; the proposed Missouri Valley Authority; and other river valley
and water development; speaker, Clifford H. Stone.
January 21
Federal and State Income Taxes; speaker, George T. Evans.
February 18
Social meeting; speaker, S. Arthur Henry.

Longmont
Louisville

March 18
Longmont
Some phase of Medical Jurisprudence or Medical Administration; joint
meeting with the physicians of the county; speaker to be provided by
the Boulder County Medical Society.

DICTA
April 1

District Court Room, Boulder
Annual election of officers.
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10:00 A. M.

April 15

Ladies' night.

Boulder

May 20

An open date.

Boulder

Committees for the Year
Legal Assistance
Real Estate Standards
Frank F. Dolan, Chairman
Dudley I. Hutchinson, Chairman
Commercial Relations
Vergyl H. Reynolds, Chairman

Report of the President of the Colorado Bar
Association to the Members
The Annual Meeting
In February your Board of Governors, at a special meeting, authorized an application to be made to the Office of Defense Transportation
for authority to hold the annual meeting at Colorado Springs during
September or October. The ODT, on August 4th, disapproved the
application for the reasons, among others, that transportation facilities
will, because of relocation and demobilization of members of the armed
services, be more heavily taxed during that time than at any time in the
past. Whether the end of the Japanese war and the termination of gas
rationing will alter the situation cannot be foreseen, but we have renewed our application for permission to hold the convention and hope
that it will be granted. If it is not granted your officers and the Executive
Committee have determined to hold a meeting of the Board of Governors, committees and delegates from the local associations, in Denver,
some time during the month of October.
Through cooperation with the officers of the Denver Bar Association a dinner will be held and some speaker of prominence secured. The
morning and afternoon will be devoted to meetings of the Board of Governors, committees and a general session to be attended by delegates and
alternates to be selected by each of the local associations.
The regulations promulgated by the ODT prohibit the holding of
a convention without consent of the ODT where more than fifty attend
from outside the immediate area. It seems clear that a meeting of the
Board of Governors, committees and delegates would not violate this
provision and at the moment it appears to be the only method by which
your association can carry out the provisions of the by-laws and to pro-
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vide for the transaction of certain necessary business which would ordinarily be taken up at the annual meeting.
The date and place of the meeting will soon be announced in the
columns of the Public Ledger and by communications addressed to the
presidents of each of the local associations.
If there should be a change in the regulations of the ODT so as to
permit the holding of the annual meeting as in the past, we are hopeful
that the meeting can be held.
Refresher Courses
As a result of recent discussions it is expected that the three law
schools of the state, in cooperation with our committee on Legal Institutes and War Committee, will soon begin refresher courses and institutes designed primarily to aid those of our members who have been
away in the service to study and review the changes in the law since
Pearl Harbor. The law schools will likely assume the task relative to
those students whose courses were interrupted by the war and their recent
graduates whose entry into the practice was postponed, and our committees will handle the problem of the practicing lawyer who needs a
review and bringing up to date on certain essential subjects, such as real
estate, probate and trust, taxation, rules of civil procedure, etc. Since
many of these returning lawyers and other members of the bar who are
interested will be unable to attend such refresher courses or institutes, it
is our hope that the lectures on these subjects can be mimeographed or
published in DICTA or the Public Ledger so as to be available to them.
The re-establishment of legal institutes, the operation of which
was interrupted by the war, is one of the aims of your officers, and we
feel that the need for refresher courses will advance the opportunity for
re-establishing such institutes on a permanent basis. I have suggested
that when we are again able to hold our annual meetings two or three
days immediately preceding such meetings be set aside for legal institutes
on essential subjects.
Committee Activities
The Lawyers War Emergency Committee continues to function as
the most active and important committee of the Association. National
recognition which has been expressed by the Army, Navy and heads of
other military and governmental services and by the soldiers and their
dependents who have been benefited, gives us just cause to be proud of
the part which our association has played in the war effort and will
continue to play in the post-war reconstruction period.
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Since this association must of necessity operate to a considerable
extent through its committees, I urge the chairman of each committee to
prepare a report and transmit it to me or to the secretary as soon as possible so that it may be published and be available for presentation to
such meeting as we may be able to hold.
By action of the Board of Governors, I have been authorized and
directed to appoint a special committee to make a thorough study and
recommendations regarding the judicial machinery and administration
of justice in the state. I have consulted with a number of members who
have agreed to serve on that committee and expect soon to announce the
names of the committee personnel. It is the consensus of your governors
that there is a need for such a study and that it should be thorough.
Other Activities
A recommendation authorized through your Board of Governors
for the appointment of the Honorable Orie L. Phillips, senior judge of
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, to the vacancy on the Supreme
Court of the United States was recently forwarded to the president and
the attorney general of the United States. At this writing no appointment has been made. If Judge Phillips should be selected, it will not
only be a recognition of the bar and bench of our state, but will provide
a representative on that court from our western country, and we shall be
pleased.
Each of the local associations has been asked to study the suggestion regarding a judicial council and information concerning this is
embodied in a pamphlet issued by the American Bar Association and in
the hands of the officers of each local association. The plan is for the
establishment of a council, composed of representatives selected from the
Supreme Court, the district courts, the bar associations and other lay
organizations, the selections being made by such courts or organizations
and by the governor. Its purpose is to study during the recesses of the
legislature problems relative to the improvement of government and to
make recommendations to each session of the legislature. If the local
associations approve the plan, our association expects to recommend the
establishment of such a council to the legislature and an appropriation to
finance its activities.
I am glad to report that the finances of the association are in excellent condition. This is due not only to the prompt payment of the regular dues by our members, but to the generous response of a large number
of our members taking out sustaining memberships.
BENJAMIN E. SWEET,
President: The Colorado Bar Association.
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Hints on Bill Draftingt
BY WILLIAM B. HENDERSON*

The ordinary citizen is required to obey the law. It must be so
phrased that he understands what it means. The first rule of draftsmanship is to use modern, everyday language. The person who uses hackneyed couplets and time-worn legal expressions is either trying to impress someone with his knowledge of obsolete legal style, or is too lazy
to select and employ words of his own.
Use the same word to express the same sense. The substitution of
words to break monotony of phraseology leads to confusion. Rhetorical
flourishes and word painting must be avoided. Follow the style of
Jeremy Bentham rather than that of the Letters of Junius. Beauty of
expression must yield to clarity. Synonyms should be avoided.
Use an adjective or an adverb rather than a phrase. Phrases tend
to prolixity and may separate the grammatical subject from the grammatical predicate. Never use a phrase when a word is its exact equivalent.
Instead of "is hereby authorized and it shall be his duty to," use "shall."
Brevity is commendable, but must yield to clarity. Use nouns
rather than pronouns, even if the noun must be repeated. Use the active
rather than the passive form of the verb, because it is stronger and more
positive.
As the law speaks in the. present, use the present rather than the
future conditional tense. Use "ifit is necessary," not "if it shall be necessary." It is preferable to use the present tense of a verb rather than the
future or imperative; as, "the term 'employee' means" rather than "the
term 'employee' shall mean.
An enactment in simple form is a declaration directing or empowering the doing of, or directing abstention from doing a particular act or
thing. Such an enactment consists of a legal subject and a legal action
(predicate) ; a noun and a verb. In the personal form, the subject is the
person who is directed and empowered to do, or prohibited from doing
the thing mentioned. In the impersonal form, it is the thing to be done
or left undone. Except where there are several classes of persons constituting the subjects, the impersonal form should be avoided, because it
encourages the use of the passive form of verb, a much weaker construction than the active form.
When it is necessary to limit the declaration or describe the instances
to. which the law is to operate, there must be a statement of the case to
which the law applies. Where possible, the case should be stated at the
tReprinted by permission from The Bench and Bar of Minnesota. The suggestions here should be useful not only to the many Colorado lawyers who draft laws, but
also to the lawyers who draft any kind of legal instruments.
*Of the Minnesota bar.
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beginning, preceding the declaration, and introduced with words such
as "where," "when," "in the event of," "in case," or "if' with the
indicative. This gives notice that the law is limited. It must be couched
in the present.
Laws must often be called into action only upon the fulfilment of
certain conditions. The logical position for the condition is immediately
following the case. The condition clause should begin with "if," or,
when the clause is negatively stated, with "unless." Where the negative
form is used, the performance of the condition is mandatory; if the
affirmative form of expression is used, directory only. The future formn
of verb must be avoided. When the application of the law is entirely
general, or with a single named exception, statement of case and condition is not required.
Minnesota Statutes 1941, Section 645.19 reads as follows: "Provisos shall be construed to limit rather than to extend the operation of
the clause to which they refer. Exceptions expressed in a law shall be
construed to exclude all others."
This is declaratory of the common law rule.
The function of provisos is to make a special exemption from the
general statutory declaration, and they should be confined to that function. The practice of tacking every conceivable kind of provision at the
end of a sentence or section is abominable. It most frequently happens
in the case of amendments to existing statutes where the bill drafter is too
lazy, or too inexperienced to rephrase the statute to properly embrace the
amendatory provision. It is commonly introduced with words such as:
"provided, however, that," "provided, nevertheless, that," and similar.
In hundreds of appealed cases, the Supreme Court has been forced to
resort to judicial legislation, and in 90 per cent of the cases determined
that the legislature used the words in a conjunctive sense.
Where a bill contains definitions of words and phrases used in a
sense other than those found in the construction statute or in standard
dictionaries, the definition section should be section one of the act, and
preceded by "Unless the language or context clearly-indicates that a different meaning is intended, the following words, terms, and phrases,
for the purposes of this chapter, shall be given the meanings subjoined
to them." Penalties should be grouped together and placed at the end
of the bill. When incorporated into the statutes, the definitions are
placed in section one of the statutes, and the penalties in the final section.
The title must conform to the bill as drawn. Prolixity is dangerous. In a long bill, it is difficult to particularize and escape error. Generally the form "A bill for an act relating to firemen's relief associations
in certain cities; amending sections (stating them) ; and repealing sections (stating them)," is sufficient. The bill drafter must study and
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cognately follow the house and senate rules. They are printed and distributed liberally. Many meritorious bills fail of passage because of technical errors which the extremely busy committees and employees do not
have time to correct.
The most useful aids for a bill drafter are an unabridged dictionary
and an elementary textbook on English grammar. There are no textbooks as such; but Law Review articles by Robert K. Cullen and E. E.
Brossard (Oregon Law Review, December, 1944, and January, 1945)
are most helpful. Every lawyer should have in his library the United
States Government Printing Office Style Manual, and "Practical Legislation" by Lord Thring (Little, Brown 1&Co., 1902).

Special Notice Regarding Placements
An increasing number of attorneys who desire to fill an opening in
an established law office, particularly men who are being discharged
from the armed services, are listing their names and qualifications with
the Colorado Bar Association Placements Committee. All law offices
having openings for attorneys are urged to contact the Placements Committee and obtain the names and qualifications of these persons. Write:
Mark H. Harrington, Chairman
812 Equitable Building
Denver 2, Colorado, or
Phone Main 6273

IN MEMORY OF COLORADO LAWYERS WHO
HAVE GIVEN THEIR LIVES IN THE SERVICE
OF THEIR COUNTRY

MAJOR WAYNE A. BANNISTER
LIEUTENANT CHARLES W. DELANEY, JR.
LIEUTENANT (J.G.) DONALD J. GILLIAM
LIEUTENANT JOSEPH P. JOHNSON
LIEUTENANT JAMES L. LANG
LIEUTENANT ALVIN L. ROSENBAUM
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New Tax Series Published by American Bar Association and Practising Law Institute
10,000 Lawyers Participating in National Tax Program
Day-to-day tax problems of the general practitioner are explained
in a new series of monographs-Current Problems in Federal Taxation
-published by the American Bar Association's Section of Taxation and
the Practising Law Institute, as part of their national tax program for
lawyers. The publications consist of twelve pocket-size pamphlets averaging sixty pages each. The articles were written by a group of expert
tax practitioners.
The new series is designed to help lawyers recognize tax problems
and deal with typical cases which arise frequently in connection with a
client's business, investments and personal estate. Concrete suggestions
are made on what to do and what to avoid in advising a client on tax
matters.
Current Problems in Federal Taxation complements the previous
course on Fundamentals of Federal Taxation which discussed the basic
rules of law. Like the first course, lectures based on the subjects of the
monographs will be given throughout the country in cooperation with
state and local bar associations.
More than 10,000 lawyers practicing in every state of the Union
received tax instruction through the original series. Of these more than
3,500 attended lecture courses in 33 cities of 23 states.
Thirty tax experts prepared the new monographs on Current Problems in Federal Taxation under the editorship of Erwin N. Griswold,
Professor of Law at Harvard University; Roswell Magill, Professor of
Law at Columbia University; Harold P. Seligson, Director, Practising
Law Institute; and Weston Vernon, Jr., representing the Section of
Taxation.
Referring to the tax experts who contributed to the new series,
Percy W. Phillips, Chairman of the Section of Taxation, states in a
foreword to the articles:
"The authors drew on their professional skill acquired through
years of specialized experience. They endeavored to make the articles as
practical and helpful as possible. They were free to express their own
views. They also had the benefit of the reactions and suggestions of
other specialists who read and commented on the manuscripts."
Current Problems will be of great assistance to the general practitioner as well as the tax lawyer. The articles discuss tax planning in a
general law practice. They analyze the tax factors to be considered in
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beginning, conducting and liquidating a business; in planning'the disposition of a client's estate by will, trust and gift; in handling real estate
and business transactions.
The titles of the articles in the new series are:
Estate Planning
Form of Business Organization and the Tax Laws
Organization of Corporations and Sales of Assets
Corporate Reorganizations and Readjustments
Expense Deductions of Corporations
Special Relief under the Excess Profits Tax-Section 722
Preparation and Trial of Tax Cases
Income Taxes and Real Estate
Tax Problems of Farmers
Pension, Stock Bonus and Profit-Sharing Plans
Valuation Problems
Tax Planning
The cost of the complete set of 12 pamphlets is $12.50. Subscriptions should be addressed to the Practising Law Institute, 160 Broadway, New York 7, N. Y.

Practicing Law by Telephonet
By SHIPPEN LEWIS*
One of my lawyer friends once attended a meeting of four lawyers
in an older man's office. In the middle of their discussion of the troubles
of an insolvent the host called his insurance broker on the telephone and
inquired about a policy covering his household furniture, while the
others sat breathless at this magnificent display of brass.
Another lawyer friend found a case important enough to warrant
a trip to talk to a lawyer in Atlantic City rather than a letter or a telephone call. While the Atlantic City lawyer and the Philadelphia lawyer
were talking face to face, a third lawyer telephoned from Philadelphia
and the original caller then amused himself for forty minutes in his
host's library while the other two discussed their case and not his.
Very recently I went to a lawyer's office by appointment to talk
about our respective clients' positions, and twice in less than half an hour
I had to sit back and listen to fairly protracted telephone conversations
about matters which certainly were not of instant importance.
We have not yet developed well-established conventions about the
telephone, and we naturally follow the easiest path. If the telephone
tReprinted by permission from The Shingle of the Philadelphia Bar Association.
*Of the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, bar.
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rings we run to it, or seize it if it's on the desk by our side, and then the
telephone conversation takes precedence of everything else on the agenda.
That's the way it used to be in my house when I was a young boy and
the telephone was first put in. For office practice, I suggest that, except
in unusual circumstances, when someone takes the trouble to go to a
lawyer's office to talk to him, the lawyer should tell his telephone operator to hold all calls during the interview, and if there is no telephone
operator that the host should answer any call by asking if he may call
back later.
Another adjustment that I think would help us all is not to insist
always on talking over the telephone to the man you want to reach. For
instance, you want to tell the eminent Jonas Throttlebottom, Esq., that
the amount of the mortgage is five hundred thousand dollars. (It's more
fun in an article to write about five hundred thousand dollars than about
five thousand dollars.) You call Mr. T. and find that he is out, so you
leave a call. An hour later he calls you with the same result. Theoretically, this can go on so long as you both do live, with profit only to
the telephone company's stockholders and the United States Treasury.
How mitch easier for both of you if you leave a message the first time
* * * "Tell Brother Throttlebottom that the mortgage is half a
million." This sounds like advising a child not to put beans up his
nose or advising a lawyer to check his hat outside the Supreme Court
room. But many a lawyer continues to pursue his victims by telephone
until he has himself delivered the message to the destined ears, no matter
how trivial it may be.
In fact I would go further and encourage sending many messages
through others. If the man you are trying to reach has a stenographer
or a private secretary (the difference depending on relative affluence),
whether he is a lawyer or a business man, he will usually be relieved
whenever a message can be taken for him.
Sometimes, when you call up an office and ask for Mr. Coke, the
telephone operator says, "Who is it, please?" You naturally give your
name. Then, as like as not, she comes back with, "I'm sorry, Mr. Coke
is out just now; can I take a message?" Of course, you want to say,
"Well, why did you ask me my name then?" I suggest that the telephone operator could be told by her employer to reverse her patterfirst say that the boss isn't in, and then ask if the caller cares to leave his
name and perhaps a message.
Everyone remembers playing Last Tag in childhood. Grown-up
lawyers play this in reverse through their telephone operators.
"Mr. L. T. Martin is calling Mr. Simpson; Jr."
"Put Mr. Martin on, please."
"Think you, I'll wait until Mr. Simpson is on."
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"I'm sorry (or as they say in Hollywood, 'I'm sawry'), but I
can't put Mr. Simpson on until Mr. Martin is on."
This Amazonian struggle can go on indefinitely, while the innocent
principals go about their usual business. Finally the Martin warrior
wins and Mr. Simpson is triumphantly hauled to the telephone before
Mr. Martin. By this time Martin has forgotten that he put the call in
and has wandered off to look up the latest case on assault, little realizing
that he would be in danger of assault, battery and mayhem if he were
within reach of the infuriated Simpson.
To meet this situation I suggest telling your telephone operator that
it really makes little difference who gets on the wire first; that though
your time is priceless the other man thinks his is too; and that your
operator should follow the course which will make the other office feel
most content and therefore most likely to agree to your proposals. Of
course, if the same office takes advantage of your good nature too often.
you can always reverse your instructions and then enjoy the sense of
power which it gives a man to drive two women to battle with their
bare wits.
As to the use of the telephone generally, it seems to me'that for
serious matters it cannot take the place of a face to face conversation in
which you cannot only place your interlocutor with his face toward the
light and watch the play of emotion on his mobile countenance, but you
can feel relatively unhurried, especially if you are in another man's office and he is too polite to hasten your departure. I have an occasional
client who illustrates my idea well. When he asks for advice it is almost
always by telephone and the inquiry will be something like this: "I'm
a trustee for my second cousin and I want to sell a house for half as much
again as it would have been worth on the day it was put into the trust
if it hadn't burned down the night before. Will there be an excess profits
tax on the sale, and can my cousin complain because the insurance policy
is not perpetual?" If you have that kind of client face to face, you can,
with patience, make some sense out of his story.
Incidentally, if there is to be a face to face discussion, some men
regard it as a point of honor to crow on their own dung hills wherever
possible. I don't think anyone is really impressed by this. When you
want help or information, you should certainly make a point of going to
the other man's office to get it. When he wants help or information from
you, it is fair to expect him to come to you, unless he is a good deal older
lawyer than you are. If you are both on an equal footing, do whatever
is natural and easiest for both, but don't emulate the barnyard rooster.
Many of us grew up in houses without telephones and there are
probably members of our bar who started practice peacefully with no
office telephone. How many inconsequential messages were never deliv-
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ered; how many interruptions were avoided; how many briefs were
better because concentration was more easily attained. But let us recognize our blessings while we have them. We cannot yet see the stubborn
and unlovely face of the opponent to whom we are telephoning, nor can
he see the wink with which we accompany our grave statement to him
of the weakness of his position. When practicing law by television becomes possible, may I have the fortitude to stick to the humble telephone
with all its shortcomings. And I trust no reader of this article will tell
Mr. Philip C. Staples that I am a dissatisfied customer of the Bell Telephone Company, for I cannot spare the homely instrument which has
inspired this article.

Bishop Rice "Released" a Telegram
(A Lesson in Constitutional Law)
BY FRANK SWANCARA*
When it became noticed in the press that some persons were objecting to the appointment of Mr. Aubrey Williams as Administrator
of the REA only because of some alleged changes or modernism in his
theological opinions, Frank H. Rice sent a telegram to Senator Johnson,
urging support of Mr. Williams. The contents of the message were
telephoned to every news agency.
The radio and the press failed to quote, or even to mention, the
telegram of Bishop Rice. But that ignored and unnoticed document
could have been the exordium of a lecture on constitutional law. If Mr.
Williams had been aspiring to a state office in Tennes~ee, his opponents
might have invoked against him that part of the Tennessee constitution
which provides:'
"No person who denies * * * a future state of rewards and
punishments, shall hold any office in the civil department of this
state."
It seems, also and therefore, that the bar of Tennessee, under oath
to support the constitution, is obliged to search for, and oppose, any
candidates who deny, either by words or conduct, a "future state of
* * * punishments." They must keep off the ballot the name of any
Jewish aspirant, for presumably they know that the highest court oT
North Carolina said: 2
"We know that the Old Scriptures, which is the Hebrew
Bible, does not teach a future life."
*Of the Denver, Colorado, bar.
Art. IX, sec. 2, Const. 1870.
'Lady Lisle's Trial, 11 Howell's State Trials 325, as quoted in sec. 1816 Wigmore
on Ev. (2d ed).
1
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The phrase "future state of punishments" means what one court
referred to as a "bottomless lake of fire and brimstone.'' 3 Authoritative
catechisms 4say that the victims are "for all eternity * * * in dreadful
torments.'
Tennessee is not alone. Profound Philadelphia lawyers agree that
the constitution of their state contains this provision:5
"That no person who acknowledges * * * a future state of
•* * punishments, shall * * * be disqualified to hold any office."
Prior to 1877, New Hampshire went even further and required the
governor and legislators to be "Protestant."-6
In Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Maryland, Mississippi, and Texas an office holder must profess monotheism in some form.
Yet Mechem on Public Officers says that "religious beliefs or opinions
cannot be a test of political rights and privileges."
No religious test is required of a draftee or volunteer for the army.
He may take the danger, privilege, or necessity of dying in battle without
regard to his eligibility to hold office in the states named.
Frank H. Rice would have sponsored a memorial meeting in honor
of Pvt, Paul F. Nelson, whose mother, prior to his being killed in action,
was deeply grieved over the insulting propaganda that atheists do not
appear in fox-holes. 7 Had that soldier returned alive, he would have
been barred from office-holding in the states named.
Very few persons would ever attend a meeting advertised by Bishop
Rice, but that situation did not entirely suppress whatever truth the
Liberal Church had to offer. One time the material, ignored locally, was
submitted to the St. Louis Law Review, and published." Dean Wigmore
at once added it to the notes for section 1827 of his work on Evidence,
2d ed.0 That is the article which is the basis for this paper.
Bishop Rice fought for tolerance and equality. He did more than
give ecclesiastical titles to "newsmen" and others. 10
'Of course there is such 2 place, for where else would Hitler belong? And where
can the Coolidge "prosperity" now be? Doubters may consult a definition in 39 C. J. S.
887, and note 80.
5

Art. 1,sec. 4, Const. 1874.
'Const. 1784; Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 9.
2
State v. Pitt, 166 N. C. 268, 271, 80 S. E. 1060 (1914).
'72 The Truth Seeker (N. Y.) 90 (June, 1945).
'l8 St. Louis Law Rev. 105 (Feb., 1933).
'1934 Stpp. to Wigmore on Ev. (2d ed.).
"0And who would not, if he could, give a title to a cigarette jobber or a wholesale
liquor dealer?
[Editors Note: See DICTA, May, 1945, p. 117.]
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Personals
John E. Gorsuch, Denver, and Frederic L. Kirgis, former First
Assistant Solicitor of the Department of Interior and recently Special
Assistant to the United States Attorney General, have formed a partnership under the name of Gorsuch & Kirgis, with offices in the First National Bank Building, Denver.
J. Churchill Owen, Denver, former Assistant General Counsel to
the War Production Board in Washington, has rejoined the firm of
Dines, Dines & Holme, Denver.
I. R. ("Red") Schwartz, former District Enforcement Attorney
for Office of Price Administration, has opened an office at 405 University
Building, Denver.
Clarence L. Ireland and Gail L. Ireland, both former Attorneys
General of Colorado, have formed a partnership under the name of Ireland and Ireland, with offices in the Midland Savings Building, Denver.
Lieutenant Colonel Teller Ammons'headed a committee to arrange
for a Colorado Day celebration on August 5th on the island of Guam.
Several Denver men assisted him in the arrangements.
Charles Rosenbaum, Denver, and Ralph L. Carr, Antonito, have
been re-appointed by Governor Vivian to the State Board of Standards
of Child Care for terms expiring July 27, 1947.
Colonel Charles D. Bromley, Denver, has been promoted recently
from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Colonel Bromley has been overseas two and one-half years and is attached to the Southwest Pacific
Headquarters in Melbourne, Australia, as a lend-lease officer.
John F. Wilson, Denver, formerly of Grand Junction, has been
appointed Assistant Attorney General of Colorado, and assigned to the
Revenue and Game and Fish Sections
Gordon W. Johnston, Professor at the Denver University School
of Law since 1932, has been named Deputy of the Western Province of
Omicron Delta Kappa. He succeeds Roger H. Wolcott, dean emeritus of
the Law School, who resigned as deputy because of ill health.
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October 18, 19 and 20
at the Broadmoor Hotel
Colorado Springs, Colorado
Furthur Details of Program
in the Sept. Issue of DICTA
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